Why Latin America doesn’t want another round of U.S. “fixes”
The so‑called Donroe Doctrine is a Trump‑branded revival of the old Monroe Doctrine, but with a more openly interventionist edge aimed at reshaping governments in Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, and potentially Colombia. It signals a return to hard sphere‑of‑influence politics in the Western Hemisphere at the very moment when most Latin Americans want less external interference, not more.
From Monroe to Trump: Hegemony as “Protection”
- The original Monroe Doctrine (1823) declared that European powers should not colonize or interfere in the Americas, framing the Western Hemisphere as a distinct political space under U.S. protection.
- Over the 19th and 20th centuries, that “protection” often translated into U.S. interventions, occupations, and covert operations, justified as keeping rival empires out while repeatedly subordinating Latin American sovereignty to Washington’s strategic and corporate interests.
The Trump era’s rhetoric does not break with that tradition; it personalizes it. By joking that the revived Monroe line is now the “Donroe Doctrine,” Trump signals that control of the hemisphere is not just a structural U.S. policy but part of his personal political brand. The underlying logic is the same: the Americas are a U.S. sphere where external rivals are unwelcome and local governments are acceptable only if they align.
Donroe Doctrine: Content and Targets
- After the operation against Nicolás Maduro, Trump explicitly invoked Monroe to justify the raid and described it as enforcing U.S. primacy in the hemisphere.
- Analysts have labeled the emerging framework the Donroe Doctrine or a “Trump Corollary” to Monroe: Washington reserves the right to act unilaterally where it deems a regime a threat because of energy control, drug routes, migration flows, or ties to China, Russia, or Iran.
In practice, the doctrine organizes Latin America into categories:
- Venezuela as the test case, where regime change and control over strategic oil assets are cast as enforcement of hemispheric security.
- Cuba and Nicaragua as secondary nodes expected to weaken once Venezuelan support is disrupted, facing intensified sanctions, financial strangulation, and potential covert or overt operations.
- Colombia as a conditional partner: formally an ally, but targeted rhetorically when it diverges on drugs, security, or foreign alignments, with Trump hinting that even Bogotá could move from “pillar” to “problem.”
The net result is a doctrine that claims enforcement rights over who governs, who controls resources, and which external actors can operate in the region.
Historical Memory: Why Latin Americans Don’t Want This
Latin America’s skepticism is not ideological fashion; it is rooted in concrete historical experience. Across the 20th century, U.S. policy in the region oscillated between anti‑communist crusades, developmental promises, and hard security logic, leaving a trail of coups, civil wars, dictatorships, and IMF‑driven austerity. From Guatemala in 1954 to Chile in 1973 and Central America in the 1980s, the pattern was recurring: security language at the top, social trauma at the bottom.
That history informs how current populations interpret a supposedly “new” doctrine. When Washington talks about “fixing” Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua or disciplining Colombia, many in the region hear familiar signals:
- Local sovereignty downgraded in the name of a larger strategic contest.
- Social and political experimentation carried out with little accountability to the people living the consequences.
- Short‑term security or energy objectives prioritized over long‑term democratic consolidation and social welfare.
Contemporary Regional Norms: Zone of Peace vs. Sphere of Influence
Modern Latin American diplomacy has tried—unevenly, but consistently—to move away from this model. Organizations like CELAC talk about Latin America and the Caribbean as a “zone of peace,” explicitly rejecting the use of force and external interference in internal affairs. Even governments with divergent ideologies tend to agree, at least rhetorically, that regional disputes should be settled through negotiation and law rather than foreign gunboat diplomacy.
At the societal level, polling and electoral outcomes show populations more concerned with:
- Economic security, inequality, and access to services.
- Protection from criminal violence and displacement.
- Stable, predictable rules of the game for migration and trade.
None of that tracks neatly with a doctrine that defines the region primarily as a security theater for U.S.–China–Russia rivalry and a laboratory for coercive regime engineering.
Donroe vs. Popular Priorities
The Donroe Doctrine’s core premise—that Washington must actively engineer political outcomes across the hemisphere in order to secure itself—clashes directly with what most Latin Americans say they want: sovereignty, accountability of their own elites, and freedom from externally imposed shocks. For many, the real threat is not that the U.S. withdraws, but that it returns to a pattern of episodic, high‑impact interventions that leave societies to pick up the pieces once the geopolitical spotlight moves on.
Seen from below, the doctrine looks less like “protection of the hemisphere” and more like a reassertion of tutelage: great powers deciding who governs and under what economic and security terms, while citizens are left to absorb inflation, displacement, and institutional breakdown. That is precisely the model that contemporary regional initiatives—however imperfect—have tried to escape.